Abstract. For the sake of practicability of cloud computing, fine-grained data access is frequently required in the sense that users with different attributes should be granted different levels of access privileges. However, most of existing access control solutions are not suitable for resource-constrained users because of large computation costs, which linearly increase with the complexity of access policies. In this paper, we present an access control system based on ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. The proposed access control system enjoys constant computation cost and is proven secure in the random oracle model under the decision Bilinear DiffieHellman Exponent assumption. Our access control system supports AND-gate access policies with multiple values and wildcards, and it can efficiently support direct user revocation. Performance comparisons indicate that the proposed solution is suitable for resource-constrained environment.
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tion is not revealed in ciphertexts. Therefore, any people cannot learn of policy information from ciphertexts, and even legitimate decryptors fail to guess what access policies are adopted by encryptors. Anonymous ABE can realize users' privacy protection and hence it has a wide range of applications. Particularly, in the anonymous ABE scheme [25] , a novel technique called match-then-decrypt is proposed, in which a matching phase is additionally introduced before the anonymous decryption phase. The match-then-decrypt technique can significantly improve the efficiency in decryption phase of anonymous ABE. ABE with attribute hierarchies further realize the expressiveness of access policies.
Furthermore, efficient revocation mechanisms are indispensable for ABE schemes in that some secret keys might get compromised at some point. Yu et al. [29] proposed a CP-ABE scheme supporting immediate attribute revocation mechanism with the help of a semi-trusted proxy server. Yang et al. [30] proposed an attribute revocation method to cope with the dynamic changes of users' access privileges. However, all the above ABE schemes only support indirect revocation, that is, the attribute authority indirectly enables revocation by forcing revoked users to be unable to update their secret keys. Direct revocation enjoys a desirable property that revocation can be done without affecting any non-involved users. Attrapadung et al. [31] suggested two directly user-revocable CP-ABE schemes by combining the techniques of ABE and broadcast encryption (BE). Since Fiat et al. [32] first introduced the notion of BE, Boneh et al. [33] proposed a collusion resistant BE scheme, which features short ciphertexts and private keys and is adopted in our construction to realize direct user revocation. There are many other researches on revocation, offline computation and policy update [34, 35, 36] . However, the computation cost of the above schemes linearly increases with the complexity of access structures and the number of revoked users.
PRELIMINARIES

Cryptographic Background
Definition 1 (Bilinear pairing). Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of a prime order p, g ∈ R G be a generator, and G T be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order, identity of which we denote as 1. We callê a bilinear pairing ifê : G×G → G T is a map with the following properties:
ab for all a, b ∈ Z * p . 2. Non-degenerate: There exists g 1 , g 2 ∈ G such thatê(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1.
3. Computable:ê(g 1 , g 2 ) can be efficiently computed for all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G.
Definition 2 (Decision (t, , )-BDHE assumption). Security of our construction is based on a complexity assumption called the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption (BDHE). Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p, and g, h two independent generators of
where
p . An algorithm B that outputs µ ∈ {0, 1} has advantage in solving the decision -BDHE problem if
We say that the decision (t, , )-BDHE assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the decision -BDHE problem in G.
Access Policy
Usually, notation L |= W is used to represent the fact that the attribute list L satisfies the access policy W , and the case of L does not satisfy W is denoted by L |= W . In our construction, we consider AND-gate policy supporting multiple attribute values and wildcards, which is a generalization of the access policy in [4] and is also adopted in [23] .
and an access policy
, where I W is a subscript index set and
Note that the wildcard * in W plays the role of "do not care" value.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND ADVERSARY MODEL
System Architecture
As shown in Figure 1 , the system architecture of access control in cloud computing consists of four entities AA (Attribute Authority), CSP (Cloud Service Provider), DO (Data Owner), and DU (Data User).
AA is an entity who generates public parameters and master secret keys for the system. It is in charge of issuing attribute secret keys for users. It is fully trusted by all entities joining the system.
CSP is an entity that hosts the encrypted files of DO. It consists of cloud storage servers and a data service manager. Encrypted files from data owners are stored in cloud storage servers. The data service manager is in charge of controlling the accesses from outside users to the encrypted files.
DO is an entity who owns files, and wishes to upload them to the cloud storage servers provided by CSP. It is responsible for defining attribute-based access policy, and enforcing it on its own files by encrypting the files under the access policy before uploading them.
DU is an entity who intends to access the encrypted files hosted in the cloud storage servers. If DU is not revoked and his/her attributes match the underlying access policy in the encrypted files specified by DO, then he/she will succeed in decrypting the encrypted files. We give an overview of access control in cloud computing.
System Setup. AA generates public parameters and master secret keys for the system, and keeps master secret keys secretly.
User Registration. When a user wants to join the system, AA issues attribute secret keys to him/her based on his/her attributes.
New File Creation. When DO wants to share a file with some users, he/she encrypts the file under a specific access policy and uploads the resulted ciphertext to CSP.
File Access. When DU wants to access an outsourced file, he/she downloads the ciphertext from CSP and decrypts it.
Adversary Model and Security Goals
Similar to the previous systems, CSP is assumed to be honest-but-curious. In our system, the adversary is modeled as users colluding with CSP. The security goal is semantic security of data and it is reflected in the following three security requirements.
Data Confidentiality. Unauthorized DU who does not have enough attributes matching the access policy specified for a ciphertext by DO should be prevented from accessing the plaintext of the files. In addition, unauthorized access from CSP to the plaintext of the encrypted files should also be prevented.
Collusion-Resistance. If multiple DU and CSP collude, they may be able to access the plaintext of an encrypted file by combining attributes even if each of them cannot decrypt encrypted files alone. In practical attribute-based data sharing systems, these colluders should not succeed in decrypting encrypted files.
Revocation. Any user involved in a revocation event fails to access the plaintext of subsequent ciphertexts exchanged after he/she is revoked from the system.
BUILDING BLOCK CP-ABE
Definition of CP-ABE
A CP-ABE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
On input a security parameter λ, it returns the system public key P K which is distributed to DO and DU, and the master key M K which is kept private.
On input the system public key P K, the master key M K and an attribute list L, it outputs SK L as the attribute secret key associated with L.
On input the system public key P K, a message M , an access policy W specified by DO and a revocation set R issued by AA, it generates a ciphertext CT W as the encryption of M with respect to W and R, which is outsourced to CSP. Note that R specifies the users who are revoked from the system.
On input the system public key P K, a ciphertext CT W of a message M under W and R, and a secret key SK L associated with L, it outputs the message M if the user is not revoked and L |= W , and the error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Formalized Security Models for CP-ABE
In the proof of our construction, we adopt a security model called indistinguishability against selective ciphertext-policy and adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks (INDsCP-CCA2), which is demonstrated in the following IND-sCP-CCA2 game.
Init: The adversary A commits to a challenge ciphertext policy W * and a revocation information set R * .
Setup:
The challenger S chooses a sufficiently large security parameter λ, and runs the Setup algorithm to get a master key SK and the corresponding system public key P K. It retains SK and gives P K to A.
Phase 1:
In addition to hash queries, A issues a polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles:
CT W is well-formed, S returns the message M . Otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
Challenge: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length messages M 0 and M 1 from the message space, on which it wishes to be challenged with respect to W * and R * . The challenger S randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes CT W * = Encrypt(P K, M b , W * , R * ) and sends CT W * to A.
Phase 2: The same as Phase 1, except that CT W * may not be submitted for oracle O Dec .
Guess: A outputs a guess bit b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b. The advantage of A in the IND-sCP-CCA2 game is defined as follows:
Definition 3. A CP-ABE scheme is said to be IND-sCP-CCA2 secure if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can break the IND-sCP-CCA2 game with nonnegligible advantage.
6 PROPOSED ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM
Main Idea
In the proposed scheme, the decryption cost is constant and it does not linearly increase with the complexity of access policies. The scheme can support AND-gate access policies with multiple values and wildcards and it is IND-sCP-CCA2 secure. In order to realize constant decryption cost, we use the idea of ciphertext aggregation. That is, in the new file creation phase, DO generates ciphertext components by aggregating the system public key components which are specified by the attribute values in access policies. To allow authorized DU to decrypt ciphertexts, in the user registration phase, AA generates attribute secret key components for attribute values appeared in the attribute list of DU. In the file access phase, to successfully decrypt a ciphertext, DU just uses some attribute secret key components in his/her secret key which are specified by values of the access policy. In order to efficiently support AND-gate access policies with multiple values and wildcards, AA only chooses three master secret key components in the system setup phase. Then, for each attribute value, a system public key component is generated by binding the attribute index with a master secret key component based on hash functions. For the sake of CCA2 security, the last ciphertext component is generated from the first three ciphertext components based on a random factor and system public key components. Based on the bilinear pairing, the last ciphertext component helps to answer decryption queries in security proof.
Our Scheme
In this section, we present an access control system. Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups of a prime order p. Also, let g be a generator of G and e : G × G → G T be a bilinear map. Suppose the attribute set of the system is U = {ω 1 , ω 2 , · · · , ω n }. Attribute ω i has n i values and
The system is described as follows.
System Setup. AA chooses a security parameter λ and runs the following algorithm Setup of CP-ABE to generate a public parameter P K and a master secret key M K for the system. Then AA publishes P K and keeps M K secretly.
• Setup(1 λ ): AA chooses x, y ∈ R Z * p , and computes
and sets v = g β . Suppose the total number of users in the system is bounded above by some natural number m. For notational simplicity, we let I m = {1, 2, · · · , m} in the following. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m and i = m + 1, AA computes
Finally, the system public key is published by AA as
and the master key is M K = x, y, β .
User Registration. When a user with an attribute list L wants to join the system, AA runs the following algorithm KeyGen of CP-ABE to obtain an attribute secret key SK L and gives it to the user.
•
Also, AA computes d = g β sn , where sn ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m} is a serial number and it is used by AA to indicate that the current user is the sn th one to join the system. Finally, the corresponding attribute secret key is SK L = sn, sk, {σ i } 1≤i≤n , d .
New File Creation. Whenever DO wants to upload a file F to CSP, he/she chooses a symmetric key K and encrypts F with K based on a typical symmetric encryption scheme such as AES to obtain a ciphertext CT 0 . Then DO defines a ciphertext policy W for F, and runs the following algorithm Encrypt of CP-ABE to encrypt K to get a ciphertext CT W . Finally, DO sets CT F = {CT 0 , CT W } and uploads CT F to CSP.
• Encrypt(P K, M, W, R): Suppose W i = v i,k i , in order to encrypt a message M = K under a ciphertext policy W = i∈I W W i such that the revoked users specified by R cannot access it, DO computes
Note that the ciphertext policy W and revocation information R are implicitly included in ciphertexts.
File Access. Whenever DU with an attribute secret key SK L wants to access and retrieve an outsourced file, he/she firstly downloads the ciphertext CT F = {CT 0 , CT W } from CSP. Then DU computes K = Decrypt(P K, CT W , SK L ) by running the following Decrypt algorithm, and then retrieves the file F by symmetric decryption based on K. It is worth noting that DU can successfully recover F if and only if L |= W and he/she is not revoked.
• Decrypt(P K, CT W , SK L ): Suppose CT W = C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C R ,ŝ corresponding to W and R, and W = i∈I W W i with W i = v i,k i . Then CT W is decrypted by DU with an attribute secret key SK L = sn, sk, {σ i } 1≤i≤n , d as follows. DU first checks whether L |= W and sn ∈ R. If not, the decryption algorithm returns ⊥. Otherwise, DU checks whetherê(g,
If one of the two equations does not hold, return ⊥. Otherwise, DU computes σ W = i∈I W σ i and
Finally, the message is recovered as
The process of outsourcing and access is shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 . The process of outsourcing and access
ANALYSIS OF OUR ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM
Correctness
If L |= W and the user associated with sn is not revoked, the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted. Notice that v = g β and d = g β sn , we have
Suppose the indexes satisfy
L i = v i,k i , then C 0 e(σ W , C 1 )ê(H 1 (sk), C 2 )K R = M Y s Wê (g 1 , g m ) ŝ e (σ W , g s )ê (H 1 (sk), X s W ) K R = M ( i∈I W Y i ) ŝ e i∈I W σ i , g s ê H 1 (sk), i∈W X i s = M i∈I Wê (g, g) H0(y||i||k i ) ŝ e i∈I W g H0(y||i||k i ) H 1 (sk) H0(x||i||k i ) , g s ê H 1 (sk), i∈I W g −H0(x||i||k i ) s = M.
Security Analysis
We only need to prove the building block CP-ABE scheme is semantically-secure, which is demonstrated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1.
Assume that A makes at most q H1 queries to the random oracle H 1 , at most q K queries to the key generation oracle, and at most q D queries to the decryption oracle. If the decision (τ, , m)-BDHE assumption holds in G, then the proposed scheme is (τ , , m)-secure, where
. Here, τ 1 and τ 2 denotes the time complexity to compute an exponentiation in G and G T , respectively. τ p represents the time complexity of a pairing operation.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a τ -time adversary A, which breaks the proposed scheme with Adv
We build a simulator S that has advantage in solving the decision m-BDHE problem in G. S takes as input a random decision
and Z is eitherê(g m+1 , h) or a random element in G T . The simulator S plays the role of the challenger in the IND-sCP-CCA2 game, and interacts with A as follows.
Init. The simulator S receives a challenge access structure W * = i∈I W * W i and a revocation information set R * specified by the adversary A, where I W * = {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i w } with ω ≤ n represents the attribute index set specified in W * . During the game, A will consult S for answers to the random oracles H 0 , H 1 and H. Roughly speaking, these answers are randomly generated, but to maintain the consistency and to avoid collisions, S keeps three tables L 1 , L 2 andL to store the answers used.
Setup. S needs to generate a system public key P K. S firstly chooses j * ∈ R {1, 2, · · · , w} and x, x , y, y ∈ R Z * p . Then, it does the following:
Also, for k = k i j , S computes
2. For i j * , suppose W i j * = v i j * ,k i j * , then S computes
Also, for k = k i j * , S computes
Furthermore, S chooses ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 , φ 2 , φ 3 ∈ R Z * p , and computes
, where U * ⊆ R W * denotes the target set of involved users to be challenged by A when revocation events occur. Finally,
The adversary A makes the following queries.
• Hash Oracle O H0 and OĤ are answered in a trivial way.
• Hash Oracle O H1 (sk): We consider there is not an item containing sk in L 1 . If sk corresponds to an attribute list L in the key generation oracle, S adds the entry sk, g i j g z to L 1 and returns g i j g z , where z ∈ R Z * p and i j is associated with L and satisfies L i j / ∈ W i j . Otherwise, S randomly chooses i j ∈ R {1, 2, · · · , n}, z ∈ R Z * p , adds the entry sk, g i j g z to L 1 and returns
For t = i j , S chooses z ∈ R Z * p and computes σ t as follows:
If one of the two equations does not hold, return ⊥. Furthermore, S checks ifĥ +ŝφ 2 + φ 3 = 0 holds. If so, S aborts. Otherwise, S chooses sn ∈ R {1, 2, · · · , m}, sets γ =ĥ +ŝφ 2 + φ 3 ,Ĉ = Cĥ
, and returns
where y W = w j=1 H 0 (y||i j ||k i j ), and
, and defines X W * , Y W * as follows:
Suppose A summits two messages M 0 and M 1 of equal length. S chooses b ∈ R {0, 1}, and computes
, and computes C * 3 = hĥ * ϕ1+ŝ * ϕ2+ϕ3
and
It is noted that CT
). On the other hand, when Z is a random element in G T , CT W * is independent of b in the adversary's view. Phase 2. Similar to Phase 1 with a restriction that A cannot query O Dec (·) on the challenge ciphertext CT W * .
Guess. A outputs a guess bit b of b. If b = b, S outputs 1 in the decision m-BDHE game to guess that Z =ê(g m+1 , h). Otherwise, it outputs 0 to indicate that Z is a random element in G T . We note that S will abort in decryption queries if h +ŝφ 2 + φ 3 = 0 holds. However, since the values φ 2 and φ 3 are respectively hidden by blinding factors ϕ 2 and ϕ 3 , A could not obtain any information on φ 2 and φ 3 from decryption queries, and hence the probability thatĥ +ŝφ 2 + φ 3 = 0 occurs is at most
), then CT W * is a valid ciphertext and we have
If Z is a random element in G T , the message M b is completely hidden from A, and we have Pr
Therefore, the simulator S has at least a non-negligible advantage − q D p in solving the decision m-BDHE problem in G within time τ . It easily follows that the time complexity of S is
Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze and compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the previous CP-ABE schemes from the aspects of security and efficiency. Table 1 shows the performance comparison in terms of the size of ciphertext (CT) and the system public key (PK) size, the computation overheads of encryption and decryption, the expressiveness of access policy, and the revocation mechanism. For simplicity, we use e and p to represent an exponentiation operation and a pairing operation, respectively. Let n be the total number of attributes in universe, s be the number of attributes the user has to hold in order to match the access policy, t be the number of attributes associated with the user's secret key, s m and t m be the maximum size allowed for s and t, m be the maximum number of users in the system, r be the number of revocation events, and N be the total number of attribute values in the system. We denote the bit length of an element in a group G by |G|. In addition, IAR and DUR respectively represent "Indirect Attribute Revocation" and "Direct User Revocation".
Schemes
Parameter Size Computation Cost Policy Revocation CT PK Encryption Decryption HSM [12] 2|G| + |G T | (n + 4)|G| 3 e 2 p Type 1 † × EM [13] 2|G| + |G T | (N + 2)|G| + |G T | 3 e 2 p Type 2 ‡ × CZF1 [14] 2|G| + |G T | 2n|G| + 2n|G T | 3 e 2 p Type 3 § × CZF2 [14] 3|G| + |G T | + |Z * p | (2n + 3)|G| + 2n|G T | 6 e 6 p+2 e Type 3 × YWR [29] (n + 1)|G| + |G T | (3n + 1)|G| + |G T | (s + 2)e (n + 1)p Type 3 IAR AI1 [31] (s + 2)|G| + |G T | (sm + tm + 2m + 1)|G| (2s + 3) e+1 p (2s + m + 1) p Type 4 DUR AI2 [31] ( Table 1 , we know that the CP-ABE schemes [12, 13, 14] and the proposed scheme have small and constant computation cost. Although enjoying constant computation cost, the schemes [12, 13, 14] fail to support revocation mechanisms. Also, the access policies in [12] only support single attribute value. Furthermore, the scheme [29] supports indirect attribute revocation, and only the schemes [31] and the proposed scheme enjoy direct user revocation. However, the schemes [29, 31] suffer an efficiency drawback that the encryption and decryption cost is not constant in terms of the the number of e or p.
Based on the above analysis, we further compare schemes in [31] denoted as AI1, AI2 and ours with respect to the ciphertext length in Figure 3 . As for the ciphertext length comparison, we set |G 0 | = |G T | = 160 bits and the number of revocation events as r = 5. Note that the ciphertext length of the scheme AI2 is linearly proportional to r. Both the ciphertext length of AI1 and AI2 linearly increases with s. On the other hand, we do simulation experiments based on the Stanford Pairing-Based Crypto (PBC) library [37] and a Linux machine with 3.30 GHz × 8 Intel Xeon(R) E3-1230 CPU and 7.5 GB of RAM. The simulation results are shown in Figure 4 . In the simulation, the maximum number of users in the system is set as m = 500. In order to precisely evaluate the decryption cost, a total of 100 distinct access policies are generated, where each attribute has a positive occurrence. For each access policy, the experiment is repeated for 30 times and the final result is an average value. It is noted that both the decryption cost of the scheme AI1 and AI2 linearly increases with the number of columns in access policies, and the proposed scheme enjoys small and constant decryption cost. Generally, we argue that the proposed ABE scheme is more suitable for access control in cloud computing.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient data access control system in cloud computing. The main building block is a new CP-ABE scheme, which enjoys constant computation cost and direct user revocation. The proposed access system is proven secure in the random oracle model, and it can efficiently support AND-policy with multiple attribute values and wildcards. Extensive performance comparisons indicate that the proposed solution is extremely suitable for resource-constrained applications.
